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This paper explores Russian image construction by analyzing Russia’s Federal Law No.272-FZ, 
known in the U.S. and referred to in this paper as the Dima Yakovlev Law, which bans the U.S. 
adoption of Russian orphans. This research challenges the commonly held view that this law 
was solely an act of political retaliation against the U.S. by instead indicating that the law more 
broadly illustrates the Russian state’s long-term image construction process. The Dima Yakovlev 
Law presents a useful case study in this regard as it received considerable public attention from 
Americans and—notably so—Russians. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the events 
preceding the passage of the Dima Yakovlev Law are discussed. The next sections unpack the 
Russian image construction process by exploring the development and lasting significance of 
the Soviet “happy childhood” and anti-West sentiments. The discussion then focuses on the 
fluidity of Russia’s national identity and mythmaking, two phenomena that have strong linkages 
to the image construction process. The final section provides concluding remarks regarding the 
lasting impact and future implications of the Dima Yakovlev Law.
The author can be reached at aclay6@vols.utk.edu.
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Introduction
The claim that the Russian state pursues an “anti-West, nationalist, political agenda” only 
begins to capture the complexity of the government’s orchestrated attempts to manage the image 
of Russia.1 This paper explores Russian image construction by analyzing Russia’s Federal Law 
No.272-FZ, known in the U.S. and referred to in this paper as the Dima Yakovlev Law, which bans 
the U.S. adoption of Russian orphans. The paper’s argument challenges the commonly held view 
that this law was solely an act of political retaliation against the U.S. by instead positing that the 
law more broadly illustrates the Russian state’s long-term project of image construction. The Dima 
Yakovlev Law presents a useful case study in this regard as it received considerable public attention 
from Americans and—notably—Russians. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the events 
preceding the passage of the Dima Yakovlev Law are discussed. The next sections analyze the 
Russian image construction process by exploring the development and lasting significance of the 
Soviet “happy childhood” and anti-West sentiments. The discussion then focuses on the fluidity 
of Russia’s national identity and mythmaking, two phenomena that have strong linkages to the 
image construction process. The final section provides concluding remarks regarding the lasting 
impact and future implications of the Dima Yakovlev Law.
Theory
This paper’s argument mirrors a constructivist framework and draws upon the work of key 
scholars who applied this theory to analyze international relations. Most notable is Alexander 
Wendt, who in particular articulated in the late twentieth century the distinct role that “state 
identities and interests” play in this realm.2 Such arguments diverge from other prominent schools 
of thought. For example, neoliberals perceive the world to be in anarchy and consequently value 
cooperation and institutions in understanding international relations. In contrast, constructivism 
draws from “beliefs, expectations, and interpretations,” overall perceiving the world in terms of 
social constructions.3 Moreover, all of these dimensions are fluid and rarely remain unchanged, 
which prompts constructivists to often explore the trajectory of state actions, decisions, and 
interests throughout history.4 This exploration, coupled with an understanding of state identity 
and interests, ultimately aids construcivists in proposing future actions and decisions of state 
actors. 
In addition to Wendt’s theory, this paper also aligns with notable scholar Ted Hopf. In 
his work, he defined the multiple identities of Russia that had developed by the late twentieth 
century.5 Such analysis demonstrated that state actors in international relations may embody 
more than one identity. This paper will present a brief overview of national identity formation in 
Russia, which has quite often been subject to considerable change and upheaval as state interests 
evolve and leaders change. Furthermore, Hopf posited that the Soviet and Russian approach to 
foreign policy has been shaped by “the identities of key actors.”6 This distinctly constructivist 
lens contrasts with other theories that attribute “the influence of external factors” as primarily 
molding a state’s foreign policy.7 In this essay, image construction is the independent variable 
and a macro-level tool manipulated purposefully by the state when shaping its foreign policy and 
interactions with other national actors. Image construction is thus interactive and accentuates the 
role of individual actors and their interests, which are shaped by cultural, historical, and political 
factors.
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Discussion
U.S-Russia relations vis-à-vis adoption policy
This section details the adoption policy exchange between Russia and the U.S. around the 
time that the Dima Yakovlev law was passed. In 2011, then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov initiated talks to improve the U.S.-Russia adoption 
policy and consequently created the Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children, or Adoption Agreement.8 This 
agreement was the result of growing public attention and discourse in both countries surrounding 
several mishandled cases of adopted child abuse in the U.S. The Russian media had taken a 
particular interest in these cases, repeatedly covering these stories and raising questions about 
American parenting and the overall safety of Russian orphans in the U.S. The Adoption Agreement, 
intended to be in effect until 2014, established rules to “strengthen procedural safeguards in 
adoptions” between the two countries.9 
In broader terms, Russia has noticeably altered its adoption policy to shift toward promoting 
domestic adoptions and creating institutional barriers within its international adoption process. 
This transition has been almost exclusively done under President Putin’s leadership.10 Since 
1998, under Putin’s order, prospective parents must “meet their child two times before being 
eligible to adopt,” which can conflict with work schedules, time availability, and ultimately create 
a “financial burden.”11 Furthermore, found in Russia’s Family Code, prospective parents must not 
be “recognized as either fully or partially incapable by the court” and are ineligible if their “living 
conditions do not meet health or sanitary standards” or they “do not have an income to ensure 
minimum subsistence levels.”12 
Perhaps the most convincing piece of evidence to support Russia’s de-emphasis on 
international adoptions is found in Article 124 of the Family Code. It affirms that international 
adoptions “shall be admitted only in cases when it is impossible to give these children for 
upbringing into the families of citizens of the Russian Federation, who permanently reside on the 
territory of the Russian Federation, or for adoption to the children’s relatives, regardless of the 
citizenship or the place of residence of these relatives.”13 Various studies have also explored the 
level of bureaucracy prospective parents face, for example, the level of documentation requested 
by the Russian Federation Civil Code, adoption agency, and the Ministry of Education and Science.14 
Coupled with the demands made by similar U.S. institutions, the overall process is costly, at times 
surpassing $50,000.15 Lastly is the fact that “a child’s information must have been placed on the 
federal database of children without parental care for at least six months before any child may be 
adopted by prospective international adoptive parents,” which further underscores that Russia is 
instituting an increasingly restrictive international adoption policy.16   
American citizens and leaders were caught by surprise when, at the end of 2012, President 
Putin signed into law the Dima Yakovlev Law.17 Still in effect today, this law “bans the adoption 
of Russian children by U.S. citizens, bars adoption service providers from assisting U.S. citizens in 
adopting Russian children, and requires termination of the U.S.-Russia Adoption Agreement.”18 
Close to fifty adoptions that were being processed when this law was passed were nullified, 
prompting outcry in both the U.S. and Russia and warranting coverage by numerous U.S. media 
sources. Americans largely perceived this law as a retaliatory political act by the Russian state 
in response to the U.S. passage of the Magnitsky Act, which allows “the U.S. to withhold visas 
and freeze financial assets of Russian officials thought to have been involved with human rights 
violations.”19 Russians’ response, however, likely stemmed more from the belief that Russian 
orphans’ lives were at serious risk in the U.S.20 Public opinion polls purportedly showed that 54% of 
Russians supported the Dima Yakovlev Law upon its passage, growing to 76% by December 2015.21
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Soviet legacy draws domestic support for adoption policy 
Even before, but especially during Soviet times, the state resorted to drawing from 
historical legacies to justify its interests, particularly through inciting “forms of nostalgia based on 
reconsideration, or on restoration of imperial memory.”22 Indeed, studies have shown that Russian 
leaders use history as “the main source of justification” for their political moves.23 Thus, the first 
factor that pushes the Russian state to construct a restrictive adoption policy draws upon the 
Soviet belief that spending one’s childhood in Russia is ideal. Both now and in the past, state actors 
have projected an image that Russia is the best environment for youth. 
As communism emerged in the Soviet Union, the state took a particular interest in youth to 
sustain support for socialism.24 Personal narratives largely constructed by the state abounded that 
highlighted how wonderful life was growing up in the Soviet Union. An influential discourse thus 
emerged and spread across the nation that constructed images of happy childhoods under the 
regime. In effect, this childhood was distinct from any other country and “children were of the only 
privileged class in the new socialist world.”25 Communist actors were responsible for creating this 
narrative in efforts to promote widespread support and loyalty to the regime. Yet this narrative 
was largely deceptive and did not reflect the reality of living conditions for many Russians. 
Orphans–along with children of lower classes and from disadvantaged areas–continued to be 
largely ignored by the state and were a blatant exception to this happy childhood image.26 Instead, 
they experienced “deportation, war, famine, and abandonment” and later were state targets to be 
“liquidated.”27 These circumstances underscore the hypocrisy of communist propaganda. 
The significance of this historical perspective is twofold. First, similarities can be drawn 
between the state treatment of Russian orphans during Soviet times and today. Though Putin 
and his political elite perpetuate a discourse and image of Russia as the best environment for 
its children, including orphans, they generally ignore the corruption and financial troubles that 
plague the orphanage system. Therefore, the notion of a happy childhood in Russia remains alive 
in the Russian public’s minds, fueling support in banning U.S. adoptions and the belief that Russian 
orphans cannot experience a better life elsewhere. The potency of memory politics—defined as 
“a purposeful activity for the representation of a particular past image which is needed in modern 
political context using different verbal . . . and visual . . . practices”—illustrates how the Russian 
state today resurrects previous popular support for the happy childhood notion to reinforce that 
Russian orphans must be cared for in Russia.28 Complementary to constructivist thought, memory 
politics is used “to design the most efficient collective identity, reduce the level of conflict within 
the state and to represent a country in the global community.”29 These points are often the desired 
results of image construction. In integrating a past political tool to mold public support today, the 
state appears to have had considerable success in swaying Russian public opinion and projecting 
a unified stance.
Anti-West image within Russia’s adoption policy  
Taking the previous argument further, the state constructs an image of Russia as not only 
a positive environment for children, but also one that is superior to that of the U.S. In effect, this 
image substantiates the state’s efforts toward producing a good-versus-evil dichotomy between 
Russia and the U.S. Through control over the media and political discourse, the state amplifies the 
dangers of living in the U.S. and American parenting to distort the image of the U.S.
The Russian state inflates the stories of Russian orphans who have died after being adopted 
by American parents, suggesting that U.S. parenting is not just bad but downright abusive. To start, 
it cannot be overlooked that “between the years of 1996 and 2008, fifteen Russian adoptees have 
died under the care of their United States citizen adoptive parents.”30 The media and bureaucratic 
elite have used this statistic to produce outlandish or hyperbolic narratives. They emphasize issues 
like domestic violence, crime, and gun violence across the U.S.31 For example, Russia’s popular 
Pravda news source stresses that “over the past 10 years, four times more children died in the U.S. 
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from domestic violence than soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan during the war.”32 Furthermore, widely 
accepted public perceptions include the notions that the U.S. court system does not adequately 
penalize abusive U.S. parents toward Russian adoptees, U.S. parents force their Russian children 
into human trafficking, and U.S. parents leave their Russian children on isolated farms and never 
return.33 Ultimately, Putin’s leadership and the state control of media construct an image of the 
U.S. that is unsafe and violent, a stark contrast to the ideals woven into the happy Soviet childhood. 
However, what the Russian state purposefully neglects to highlight is the relative success of 
U.S. adoptions of Russian orphans and shortcomings of the Russian orphanage system. For example, 
“in this period from 1996 to 2008, over 54,525 Russian children were adopted by families in the 
United States.”34 In effect, “the death of these children represent .0275 percent of the adoptions 
that occurred during that period.”35 Statistics on the number of deaths of Russian orphans in Russia 
are not readily accessible, but it is reasonable to suggest that “numerous incidents of adoption 
abuse and fatalities” unfortunately occur in both Russia and the U.S.36 Indeed, the sad irony of the 
situation is that Russians do not largely recognize “the similar situations that are occurring much 
more frequently within the Russian Federation itself.”37 Studies by outside scholars and nonprofit 
organizations expose the “human rights abuses coupled with corruption, and ultimately the lack of 
resources with which orphanages and other institutions must work” in Russia.38 
As briefly mentioned, accusing U.S. parents of child abuse is a popular state tactic. While 
abuse that does occur can never be justified, the state’s gross generalization does not take into 
account that orphanage staff often did not disclose relevant information to those U.S. parents 
who were adopting Russian orphans who had mental disabilities or medical problems, which then 
led to a new host of challenges upon these families’ arrival to the U.S.39 Indeed, research has 
disclosed “well over 165,000 children live in Russia’s state orphanages for children with disabilities, 
comprising nearly 50% of the country’s orphanage system.”40 Moreover, statistics of child abuse in 
Russia are often manipulated, so little attention is given to this issue within the country. While the 
deaths that did occur in the U.S. should not be forgotten, the Russian state amplifies and distorts 
the stories to use them as political leverage in demonizing the West. The result is that the Russian 
public largely supports a restrictive adoption policy. 
An evolving Russian national identity  
So far, this essay has established the connection between the Dima Yakovlev Law and the 
state’s broader image construction process, taking into account the historical and political layers 
that help to produce it and foster the support of the Russian public. Now, this paper explores the 
fluidity of Russian national identity, which has the potential to complement the country’s image 
construction process yet at present challenges the state’s ability to produce a single image.  
A common mechanism to construct a national identity is to establish the “Other,” which 
Russia has made the Western world, particularly the U.S., to be. Anti-West sentiments stem from 
“the nineteenth century, if not further, first concerning Europe and later the United States.”41 
In fact, “from the time of Peter the Great, Russia defined itself in opposition to ‘the West’ as 
its significant ‘other.’”42 These sentiments were later used in the political realm in communist 
Russia, where “official ideology said that aggressive capitalist robbers were preparing to invade 
the worker’s paradise.”43 Today, decisions like passing the Dima Yakovlev Law reflect the Russian 
state’s broader perception that the West symbolizes “capitalist exploitation, moral decadence, and 
American dominance.”44 Furthermore, after the breakup of the USSR, there was “disillusionment 
with Western economic prescriptions for Russia and, even among liberal Russians, a feeling of 
betrayal by the West at the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe.”45 The Russian state presents 
itself as the heir of the Soviet Union and strives to re-establish its former prestige.46 Reflecting this 
belief, Putin’s speech in 2007 underlined the radical upheaval of the current “global balance of 
power” and asserted that Western powers would no longer serve as hegemonies.47 
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Of note, Russian identity formation does not include a distinct ethnic dimension, which 
is often integrated in identity-building processes. Scholars cite this reason as being because 
“imperial identity ‘gave the Russians a very weak sense of themselves as an ethnos, and to a 
considerable extent it divorced Russian national identity from ethnicity.’”48 Ethnicity is also ignored 
in Russian political discourse. For example, political leaders like Yeltsin and Putin have “address[ed] 
their fellow citizens as rossiiane, the non-ethnic word for Russians, and the Russian Constitution 
refers to the ‘multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation.’”49 Amidst heated ethnic conflicts in 
the post-Soviet space, this avoidance of distinct ethnic ties might serve to bolster Russia’s fragile 
identity formation process. Yet Russia’s expanding compatriot policy may establish ethnic ties 
that may be a factor toward promoting a feeling of shared identity among Russians.50 President 
Putin has especially incorporated aspects of “imperial and the Soviet traditions” in attempting 
to consolidate a national identity to legitimize its image construction process.51 Notable ways in 
which he integrates history into national identity building includes the fact that he “brought back 
the Soviet state anthem as the Russian anthem” and “the tsarist flag and eagle.”52 
This section highlighted the evolving nature of Russian national identity, which obstructs 
the state’s success at establishing a unified image. At the same time, the growing trend of state 
centralization under Putin’s leadership may be one factor that could help to bolster a more 
concrete national identity, which in turn might project a more consistent image of Russia. Drawing 
from constructivism, the above discussion also underscores the importance of historical legacy, 
particularly imperialist times and Soviet rule, in shaping the trajectory of Russia’s identity building. 
Of note, this section has not emphasized external factors and international events—such as 
intervention in Chechnya and the terrorist attacks in the U.S.—that likely also play a role in Russian 
identity formation. Instead, this section mirrors constructivist thought by accentuating the role of 
national actors, national interests, and historical memory in influencing identity and images. 
Mythmaking in image construction
Despite the fluidity of Russian national identity, there is a recurring presence of nationalism 
in political discourse and decision-making.53 This phenomenon is a product of a common strategy 
known as mythmaking, which underpins the image construction process. Moreover, this tactic 
has been and still is used by the Russian state in attempting to establish a national identity.54 As 
described earlier, the pervasive memory of the Soviet childhood concept is raised to myth-level as 
state actors perpetuate claims that Russian orphans lead a better life in Russia. 
Mythmaking is a key strategy utilized by Russian state actors, notably under Putin’s 
leadership. Mythmaking is an everyday feature in the media, for example, so that the U.S. is 
continually cast in a negative light and as a stark contrast to Russia. In particular, mythmaking is 
embodied through Russian nationalists’ mythmaking discourse of “Novorossiya,” used in both a 
geographic and cultural context.53 This concept is broken down further by a “post-Soviet” layer that 
helps “to reformulate Russia’s great-powerness and messianism.”55 A second layer of Novorossiya 
integrates “Tsarist nostalgia and the reactivation of ultraconservative Orthodox circles that benefit 
from the Kremlin’s ‘conservative turn.’”56 These two narratives are tools that nationalist actors 
use to construct an image of Russia as a mighty, formidable actor on the world stage, while 
simultaneously emitting a pure and religious presence. 
Within this mythmaking discourse, one narrative supports the Russian state’s quest in 
being a hegemonic power by revering the Soviet Union, a global power that emerged due to its 
“blend promoting a large unified territory, great-powerness, opposition to the West, and a socialist 
mission.”57 Various nationalist actors, most notably Alexander Prokhanov and Vitaliy Averyanov, 
additionally promote an image of Novorossiya based on “messianism and anti-Westernism.”58 In 
effect, their vision is a “renewed form of the Soviet Union” that opposes “Western aggression,” 
which reflects the lasting legacy of history.59 This narrative thus propels public resentment toward 
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the West, as well as establishes that Russia should rightfully reemerge as a key actor on the global 
stage.
The second narrative related to Russia’s image construction is “motivated by political 
Orthodoxy, a trend that claims a worldview inspired by religious precepts,” where the country 
is “a distinct country with strong religious values that should shape the theocratic nature of 
the regime.”60 This strand has ties to Russia’s imperial times and emphasizes “tsarist imagery, 
including pictures of Nicholas II and his family.”61 This paper makes the connection that creating 
and popularizing an image of holy Russia—against the backdrop of the evil West—justifies why 
Russian orphans should be the responsibility of the state, not that of other countries. Both images 
collectively serve to further demonize the West, casting it as morally inferior and corrupt. The 
images constructed by nationalist actors largely influence public opinion, especially in regards to 
supporting a restrictive adoption policy. 
In effect, the Russian nationalist movements that integrate mythmaking narratives today 
may not represent the majority of the Russian public but do have considerable influence in 
elite political circles. Their perception that Russia needs to counter the evil Western world and 
reemerge as a righteous, superior religious force complements the state’s overall efforts toward 
projecting Russia’s image.
Conclusion
This paper describes Russia’s image construction from a constructivist lens by exploring 
Russia’s ban on U.S. adoptions. The widespread U.S. perception that Russian orphans are now 
political pawn of the Russian state has catalyzed negative sentiments toward Russia; this, in 
contrast, challenges the Russian state’s image construction of a pious, rightfully powerful actor 
that is capable of providing for its population. This paper highlights the critical role that individual 
actors and interests have in shaping events and public perception. Analyzing the case study of 
the Dima Yakovlev Law helps to unpack the complexity of Russia’s image construction abroad 
by identifying the rationale and motivations behind the state’s decision to ban U.S. adoptions. 
What can be most definitively stated is that the Russian state is intent on projecting a host of 
positive images of Russia and appears undeterred amidst international criticism. No substantive 
attempts have been made on the national level to dismantle the Dima Yakovlev Law, and public 
support has not seemed to waver over the years. These circumstances underscore that this law 
is an orchestrated move by the Russian state in its long-term project of image construction. They 
also serve as a dismal omen that the trajectory of Russian orphans’ lives may continue to be largely 
subject to and determined by political actors and their self-interests for years to come.
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